Click here to respond
to this discussion regarding the Full Description Problem.
Some Results (?) of our Discussion
of Smart
A. The Idea (Ideal) of a Full Description:
A full description of a person (S) at a time
(t) would be a complete list of all the properties instantiated by S at
t.
B. The Full Description Problem:
Mental states and processes seem to be (must be?) something over
and above physical states and processes, since a full description of a
person at a time would require that we list not only physical properties
but also mental properties.
C. Type-Type Identity:
"A=B" is a true expression of type-type identity iff the
set picked out by the term "A" is coextensive with the set picked
out by the term "B."
D. The Type-Type Identity Thesis (TTIT):
Mental states are type-type identical with physical states. That
is, every mental predicate (M) picks out a set of states or processes which
is coextensive with a set picked out by a physical predicate(P).
E. TTIT yields a solution to the Full Description
Problem:
Suppose that we have a complete list of the physical properties
of S at t. Suppose further that TTIT is true. We then know that if S instantiates
any mental properties then those properties are already represented on
the list of physical properties, The complete physical description of S
at t would thus include as a subset a complete mental description of S
at t.
F. The Multiple Instantiation Problem:
Mental states can be instantiated in a wide variety of different
physical systems. Not only human being but dogs, octopi, and (in principle
at least) silicon-based aliens can, e.g., experience pain. It is thus overwhelmingly
unlikely that there is some identifiable class of physical events (e.g.,
C fiber firing) that is type-type identical with the class of mental events
of a certain type (e.g., pain).
G. Some questions:
1. Would token-token identity thesis provide a solution to the full
description problem?
2. Would a species-relative type-type identity thesis provide a solution
to the full description problem?
3. Could TTIT itself be retained in the face of the multiple instantiation
problem simply by identifying the set of (e.g.) pain states with a massively
disjunctive set of physical states?
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