Interpretation and Analysis of Ryle's
Argument
Below is an interpretation of the structure and content of Ryle's
argument against "the official theory." The argument is a reductio
argument, turning on an application of modus tollens. That is, it
sets out to exhibit the falsity of the theory by deriving a
contradiction from it. Comments, criticism, elaboration, etc. welcome
(both about whether this indeed captures Ryles' argument and about
whether it is sound). E-mail comments to Lisa (lmandels@ucsd.edu) to post.
Ryle's Argument Against the Official
Theory
Suppose (1) Mental states and processes are states and processes of a
non-physical mind -- a private, "inner" correlate of the body, known
directly only from the first person perspective. {The Official
Theory}
(2) If {The Official Theory} then the concepts of our standard mental
vocabulary refer to private states of private minds.
(3) If the concepts of our standard mental vocabulary refer to
private states of private minds then knowledge of the mental lives of
others is impossible.
But (4) We have knowledge of the minds and mental lives of others.
Therefore (5) Not: The Official Theory.
Formulation of Ryle's Negative Argument Against
Dualism by Michael Weisberg
1. Dualists maintain that mental states are non-physical and that they
somehow exist within a given person. This being the case, mental states
can not be known by others.
2. Mental states have semantic consequences; they are describable by
mental predicates. For example: Michael "is tired" or "is in pain."
3. If the first proposition is correct, we should never be able to have
knowledge of other persons' mental predicates.
4. Yet "folk psychology" and "pre-speculative knowledge" provide us with
a wealth of information about other persons' mental predicates.
Therefore, proposition 1 must be false.
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