Masataka Banno, China and the
West, 1858-1861: The Origins of the Tsungli
Yamen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
Through exhaustive examination of comprehensive sources, Masataka Banno
analyzes Chinese diplomatic history from the Arrow War to the creation of the Tsungli Yamen, a modernized central office
for foreign affairs. According to
Banno’s main argument, it was not the Treaty of Tientsin that made an institutional change
in the Chinese conduct
of foreign affairs, but the establishment of the Tsungli Yamen that ended the traditional principle of inequality
between the Chinese empire and all other states under the tribute system.
Banno regards the Arrow War as an expression of dissatisfaction
by Westerners with lack of changes
in the Chinese legal
system and tributary mind-set even after the Treaty of Tientsin and during the process of negotiation. The Tsungli Yamen symbolized a change in this old system. The emergence of the Tsungli Yamen was a turning point in China’s foreign
relations. It is for the
reasons that Banno emphasizes the significance of Tsungli Yamen in spite of its short history.
Tracing the process of negotiation and the rise of an organ for the conduct of foreign affairs under the
leadership of Prince Kung, Kuei-liang, and Wen-hsiang, Banno focuses
on conflicts between China and the four major foreign powers on the one hand,
and between the war party and the peace party within the Chinese government on the other hand. As for the role that foreign powers played in the competition between the peace
party and the war party, Banno’s evaluation is positive. Both parties wanted an “equal,” in other words, “modern,” diplomatic
system. The stability of
empire was thought to be
desirable as long as the Chinese government would remain
favorable toward foreign powers. That is why Westerners tried to cooperate with the peace parties.
Banno assumes that the friendly relationship with the foreign legation was crucial for the rise and consolidation of the
Tsungli Yamen. For instance, Banno explains the reason that Westerners postponed establishing legation in Peking in November 1860 was they feared for Prince Kung’s overthrow at the hands of the
emperor’s warlike entourage. The
presence of foreign troops in Tientsin and Taku also served as “a pillar of support to Prince Kung
against his political opponents” (241).
Banno also effectively
illuminates the struggles among factions within the Chinese government. While investigating the emergence of the peace party
as an essential leading group of the Chinese government, Banno offers a different interpretation from the stereotyped one that assumes clear splits between the war party and the peace party, or between the Chinese and Manchus. By examining various cases, Banno suggests that whether one was in the
war party or in the peace party was not decided by ethnic factors. Rather, individual attitude toward the negotiations with foreign
powers depended on personal experience in foreign affairs.
Most of reviews of
this book from contemporary scholars were favorable and positive. Lloyd Eastman
indicates that “China and the West
will surely remain the authoritative work” (The
Journal of Asian Studies, 24.1) and Mary
Wright praises it as “a model of dispassionate diplomatic history, prejudging
no issue in a complex maze of events” (Journal
of the American Oriental Society, 84.3). But even if Banno tried to maintain impartial views, it seems that Banno would not be free from the academic trends of his age. Overly optimistic views on friendly relationships between China and the West and a high
estimation of the
relationships make invisible the fundamental conflicts underlying the relationship. Nevertheless, the
thoroughness of this book by its use of extensive sources written in five languages deserves credit. It is a greatly informative and painstaking work worthy of
a careful reading.
Ji Hee Jung
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2004. All rights reserved.